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Social ontology has experienced significative growth in the last decades. In particular, a 
promising research agenda concerns social objects. The reference to social objects implies 
sharing a realistic conception of the world which allows a definitive departure from the 
post-modern vision of the social world as a fluid and elusive organism. A taxonomy that 
distinguishes between social, physical and ideal objects can, on the contrary, reinvigorate 
human sciences getting over the well-known methodological controversies of the last years. 
The theory of documentality provides heuristic power and a solid basis for organisational 
resources: all potentially reliable sources for the web society. documentality theory aims 
to represent a valid alternative to Searle ontology, and at the same time to offer both 




in 2001: a Space Odyssey, filmed in 1968, normal type-writers are used 
to write in the spaceship and hal, the computer, is a talking brain. the 
Pc would be invented a few years later, yet no one had the slightest 
inkling of it because no one realized that using a talking machine that 
simulates thinking would be trivial compared to more powerful writing 
and archiving instruments, and that this—more so than spaceships and 
jets—would be the true propellant for delocalization and globalization. 
And so, in a science-fiction film from a little over forty years ago no one 
had foreseen what, in a short time, would emerge as a writing explosion. 
the prediction that writing would eventually be engulfed by a society 
of “hot” communication—that is, radio, cinema and television—today 
seems unrealistic. This point merits our reflection. It has been stated 
and restated throughout the course of the twentieth century that ours 
is a society of communication. this concept is mistaken for two reasons: 
the first is that it does not consider the fact that any society—human or 
animal—requires communication. the second, more crucial, error is that 
it fails to consider that any instance of communication would be a sterile act 
if it were not accompanied by the act of recording, to which we entrust the 
existence and permanence of highly important things such as promises, 
roles, debts and credit, as well as our identities. it is upon this very 
hypothesis that the social ontology of “documentality” bases itself, whose 
principal theory is that documents are not an accessorial element of 
social reality, but rather (in the various forms that they can assume) its 
condition of possibility, insofar as they ensure the fixation of individual 
and collective memory.
let us verify through three mental experiments. 
1. a man sentenced to death is offered the choice between a 
cyanide capsule and a pill of amnesyne, a concoction that causes 
total amnesia. When all is said and done, there is no real difference 
between swallowing a cyanide capsule and an amnesia pill (a 
hypothetical chemical mixture that is able to provoke a state of 
total amnesia). intuitively, we might admit that it would be less 
terrifying to swallow a capsule of amnesyne than it would be to 
swallow cyanide, but the question is: how rational is our elevated 
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fear of cyanide? come what may, what we are would disappear, and 
what would remain is a mere oblivious body. 
2. let us suppose that two people are responsible for the same 
crime—only one remembers the events while the other does not. 
our dominant intuition is that the person who does not remember 
the events is in some way less guilty than the person who does 
remember them. this is fairly peculiar, considering that the 
events are the same and the one who has forgotten the events 
has (hypothetically) the same mental capacities as the one who 
remembers them. and yet, we feel as though we should offer the 
one who has forgotten the events a sort of mitigation, due to his 
limited mental capacities. We might say that his intellectual and 
moral standards were left unaltered, he just failed to remember 
certain acts—yet this simple fact makes a significant difference. 
the only punishment that appears to be appropriate for the one 
who has forgotten the events would be the administration of a 
pill of amnesyne which would make him forget everything else 
(producing a sort of civil death) or, alternatively, a capsule of 
mnemosyne that would allow him to remember everything and, as 
a consequence, force him to face his responsibilities.   
3. let us envision a marriage that takes place in the complete 
absence of documents, or with documents written in invisible ink. 
let us also imagine that, for some reason, all video cameras, photo 
cameras and cellular phones fail to record anything. moreover, for 
the scenario to be complete, let us imagine that directly after the 
ceremony the bride and the groom, the officiant, the witnesses 
and all of the participants drink the amnesyne concoction that 
was mixed into the champagne. can we truly claim that the two 
are married? We have good reason to exclude the possibility, since 
no one—not even those directly concerned—remembers anything 
about it. in fact, marriage, just as promises, bets, holidays, 
revolutions and economic crises, is a social object. as opposed to 
natural objects such as lakes and mountains, it exists only if we are 
aware of its existence, and in order to be aware of something it is, 
first and foremost, imperative that we remember it.   
these three experiments demonstrate the relevance of writing, of memory 
and of the act of recording in social ontology.
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Social ontology is a discipline that has undergone an important growth over 
the past decades. A field of research that is within it and that is particularly 
promising concerns social objects. the reference to social objects appears 
to correspond to a vision of reality in compliance with a realistic structure 
that is able to surpass the post-modern vision of the social world as a fluid 
and unseizable tower of Babel. on the contrary (Ferraris 2012), to speak of 
social objects, which are distinct from natural objects and ideal objects, might 
confer a new analytical power upon the social sciences and overcome the 
traditional identitarian and methodological problems (Ferraris 1988). 
From an ontological point of view the underlying question is the following: 
are people and behaviors the only constituents of social reality, as argued by 
the reductionists (tuomela 1995), or, in accordance with the realist intuition 
(reinach 1911, mulligan 1987, thomasson 2003, gilbert 1989), should we admit 
that a third ingredient—social objects—exists? the realist intuition appears 
to be justified, first and foremost, by theoretical considerations. Although 
their existence depends on subjects, social objects (promises, bets, money, 
and institutions) possess an autonomy that makes them different from mere 
psychological constructs, such as imagination or will. But there is a second 
motive that redounds in favor of the ontological reality of social objects: 
this is the importance of archives (and their proliferation in the information 
revolution). Why are recordings so important if not for the fact that they 
fix and make permanent social objects and liberate them from their strict 
dependence upon individual will and intentions? two theories exist with 
regard to the construction of social objects. The first, and main, one is what 
we can synthetically call “intentionality”; the other, which is being proposed 
here, is called “documentality”.
 “intentionality” is the theory proposed by John Searle (Searle 1995, Searle 
2010), which explains the construction of social reality through the rule “X 
counts as y in c”, that is, the physical object X counts as the social object y in 
the context c. For example, a piece of paper (X) counts as a bank note (y) in 
the spring of 2012 (c). this approach has been named “intentionality”. let us 
call this theory “intentionality” in order to emphasize how the imposition of 
function—considering the physical X as the social y—depends on the action of 
a faculty that Searle defines “collective intentionality”, which is comprised of 
the ability to collectively share the belief that a piece of paper is a bank note, 
that a pad of paper is a book, or that a living human body is a professor.  
 “documentality” is the alternative theory (Ferraris 2005, Ferraris 2009, 
Ferraris 2011), which states that the constitutive rule of social objects is, 
rather, “object = inscribed act”, that is to say: social objects are the product of 
social acts (those which involve at least two people) which are characterized 
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by the fact that they are inscribed, upon a piece of paper, on a computer file, 
or even, simply, within the mind of a person. 
this theory allows the construction of social reality to depend on documents 
(hence the name “documentality). there are two arguments—one stronger 
than the other—concerning collective intentionality. The first is that 
collective intentionality is nothing but the sum of individual intentionalities 
that comes to fruition in documents and in their predecessors in societies 
without writing (in rites, for instance). the second is that the same individual 
intentionality depends, broadly speaking, on writing (which we shall define 
“arche-writing”, in accordance with derrida 1967). 
let us begin, then, with the problems of intentionality. Searle’s theory 
presents more than one difficulty (Smith 2003a 2003b, Koepsell and Moss 2003, 
Ferraris 2005, Ferraris 2009), both from the point of view of the object (that 
is, the physical X that is subject to the social y) and from the point of view 
of the act (that is, the collective intentionality called upon to exercise the 
transformation of X into y).
With regard to the object, it is easy to observe that the theory is applied only 
in certain cases (for example, in the case of a human body that counts as a 
professor, or of an ordinary object that counts as a work of art, within the 
theory of ready-mades), yet it does not account for entities that are vast and 
vague (nations, corporations), entities that are present in the online world, 
which do not have a precise physical equivalent, or of negative entities, such 
as debt. the attempt to take into account these “independent y objects” (that 
is to say, objects that lack an evident physical X), undertaken by Smith (Smith 
2003), who spoke of them as “quasi-representations”, lessens the distinction 
between social objects and mental objects and, therefore, does not resolve the 
problem. nonetheless, Smith’s proposal was acknowledged by Searle (Searle 
2010). in the updated version, the constitutive rule becomes: “We make it 
the case by declaration, that the y Status Function exists in context c”. this 
rule—which is the reproposition of the theory of the speech acts (austin 
1962)—has the advantage of no longer appealing to Xs, which are oftentimes 
difficult to find. Rather, it makes the entire social reality depend on collective 
intentionality (or, more precisely, on mental states), just as when Searle 2010,  
201) states that economic reality is a product of the imagination (“massive 
fantasy”).  
there are two problems concerning collective intentionality (that is the 
function designated to transform the physical object X into the social object y, 
through an assignment of function). 
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1. First, it is not clear what is meant by “collective intentionality”, which 
appears to be an ad hoc function. From the observation of collective actions 
(gilbert 1989, gilbert 2006, Bratman 1992) we cannot infer the existence of a 
primitive  biological datum that would ensure the passage from the physical 
to the social realm. Similarly, the fact that there are mirror neurons to which 
the genesis of empathy and imitation are attributed (rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 
2006) is simply proof of the role of imitation in the social world, which has 
been widely recognized (tarde 1962), though not yet a decisive argument in 
favor of the existence of a collective intentionality.
2. collective intentionality is not able to explain social reality in its entirety, 
but only certain cooperative activities, that are the product of training and, 
therefore, appear as a result rather than a premise (Ferraris 2009). moreover, 
collective intentionality does not explain central elements of the social 
world: that is to say, dissent, conflict and the fact that a change in collective 
intentionality—in a mass movement, for example—does not necessarily 
involve a change at the institutional level.  
the problems with the theory of intentionality can be resolved by the theory 
of documentality, defined as such because it maintains that the construction 
of social objects is to be searched for in an act of recording which finds its 
eminent manifestation in documents. the theory of documentality is rooted 
in two principle theories: the theory of performatives (inspired by reinach 
1911 and austin 1962) and the theory of inscription (inspired by derrida 1967 
and de Soto 2000).  
the theory of performatives derives from the theory of speech acts, whose 
roots can be traced back, even before austin (austin 1962), to reinach (reinach 
1911). linguistic acts introduce into the world new objects that bring into 
existence demands, obligations, rights, relations of authority, debts, permits, 
names, and an array of other types of entities that, together, constitute the 
ontology of the social world.  
the theory of inscription, developed by derrida (derrida 1967) and based on 
phenomenological reflections on writing and institution (See Bojanic 1995) 
and reinach’s theory share the same origin. Seeing as though speech acts are 
evanescent, the physical basis for the existence of the entities of the social 
world—in small societies, and for simple interactions—can be identified 
by the traces in ones memory and other characteristics of the psychology 
of the people involved. in more vast societies, and for more complex social 
interactions, people’s memories are not sufficient; documents create 
and maintain those deontic, lasting and reusable powers, which expand 
human memory and create and maintain in existence the new and more 
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complex forms of social order that are characteristic of modern civilization. 
this proves to be especially evident in the economy (de Soto 2000). By 
performing documental acts (acts of compiling, recording, communicating 
and validating) we change the world and bring into existence relations of 
property, legal accounting, the organization of events and other activities 
that are typical of modern societies. Just as the combination of stocks and its 
division between shareholders creates capital, statuses create companies.  
The theory of documentality (Ferraris 2005, Ferraris 2009) entails, first 
and foremost, an explanation of the ontological conditions of the theory of 
inscription. linguistic acts are, after all, inscribed acts: without some form 
of registration, performatives would not produce social objects such as 
conferences, marriages, graduation ceremonies or constitutions. the point 
is quite simple: if, in accordance with the amnesyne mental experiment, we 
envision a graduation ceremony or a marriage or a coronation where there are 
no scribes or witnesses, then it is difficult to claim that a graduate, a husband 
and a wife, or a king were produced: social objects are closely linked to the 
forms of their inscriptions and recordings. in this sense, documents do not 
achieve social reality, but rather they constitute it.  
at the same time, the theory of documentality weakens the theory of 
inscription, which in derrida’s version was applied to reality as a whole, 
resulting in a problematic statement such as, “nothing exists outside of 
the text”. in the theory of documentality, on the other hand, the role of 
inscription seems to be decisive only within the sphere of social objects, 
whereby it can be argued that, “nothing social exists outside of the text”. 
this proposal appears to be especially innovative as it confers a practical 
importance upon a theory that is otherwise simply metaphorical, and 
factually false.
It is necessary, first and foremost, to distinguish between three different 
families of objects (Ferraris 2005, Ferraris 2009): 1. natural objects, which 
exist in space and time independently of subjects; 2. ideal objects, which exist 
beyond space and time independently of subjects; 3. Social objects, which 
exist in space and time dependently on subjects. only social objects require 
inscriptions, and this is the very reason for which the theory of inscription is 
weakened in the theory of documentality, according to which “nothing social 
exists outside of the text”. 
it is within this framework that the constitutive law of social objects is 
formed in accordance with the theory of documentality—that is, as previously 
mentioned, object = inscribed act. according to this law, a social object is the 
product of a social act (which involves at least two people, or one person and a 
machine, such as a computer), characterized by the fact that it is recorded on 
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a piece of paper, a computer file or some other digital support, or even simply 
in people’s minds. 
the theory of documentality resolves the problems of the theory of 
intentionality.
1. it explains the construction of social objects without turning 
to physical objects that have been translated into social objects, 
as occurs in Searle (Searle 1995), and avoids the troubles caused by 
vague, complex or negative entities.  
2. contrary to what is stated in Searle (Searle 1995), and especially 
Searle (Searle 2010), it does not require a recourse to collective 
intentionality. individual intentionalities, directed by previous 
documents (norms, laws) are recorded in other documents. there is 
no need to recall an ad hoc faculty; that which is called “collective 
intentionality” is simply a name for the common experience of a 
contract that includes the signatures of the contractors and the 
potential authentication of a notary. 
due to its extreme simplicity, the theory of documentality confers a 
great heuristic power and great organizational resources, especially in a 
society like that of the web. the theory strives to constitute an alternative 
to Searle’s ontology, while at the same time offers both theoretical and 
practical developments.  
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